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1The Waterfilling Game-Theoretical Framework
for Distributed Wireless Network Information
Flow
Gaoning He∗, Laura Cottatellucci† and Me´rouane Debbah‡
Abstract
We present a general game-theoretical framework for the resource allocation problem in the down-
link scenario of distributed wireless small-cell networks, where multiple access points (APs) or small
base stations send independent coded network information to multiple mobile terminals (MTs) through
orthogonal frequency division multiplexing (OFDM) channels. In such a game-theoretic study, the central
question is whether a Nash equilibrium (NE) exists, and if so, whether the network operates efficiently
at the NE. For independent continuous fading channels, we prove that the probability of a unique
NE existing in the game is equal to 1. We show that this resource allocation problem can be studied
as a potential game, and hence efficiently solved. We discuss the convergence of waterfilling based
best-response algorithm. Finally, numerical results are provided to investigate the inefficiency of NE.
I. INTRODUCTION
Recently, there has been an increasing interest for small cell networks, where people can
access Internet over many different APs or small base stations (also known as out-door femto-
cells or small cells [1, 2]). Typically, in such a wireless network, several femto-cells are installed
out-door on a given backbone network (with heterogenous links as fiber, ADSL, power line) to
provide signal coverage in dense environments. The general idea is to exploit the heterogeneous
wired infrastructure without any new cabling and provide wireless high data rate to the users
∗ Motorola Labs, Parc Les Algorithmes, 91193 Gif sur Yvette, France. (e-mail: gaoning.he@gmail.com).
† Eurecom, 2229 Route des Cretes, 06904 Sophia Antipolis, France. (e-mail: laura.cottatellucci@eurecom.fr).
‡ Alcatel-Lucent Chair on Flexible Radio, 3 Rue Joliot-Curie, 91192 Gif sur Yvette, France. (e-mail: mer-
ouane.debbah@supelec.fr).
October 2, 2009 DRAFT
2through self-organized mechanisms. Unfortunately, if users are connected to a single out-door
femto-cell, they may suffer from low throughput from time to time due to the limited-backhaul
capacity (some wireless high speed femto-cells access the Internet through low capacity DSL or
power line links, e.g., 1Mbps), despite the presence of a high speed wireless link. As a result,
users need to access to different APs in the nearby femto-cells in order to aggregate the sum
capacity of the backhaul links. An interesting concept is to consider the nearby femto-cells as
a virtual femto-cell group, whose backhaul capacity is the sum of the access capacities of all
the nearby femto-cell group (as shown in Fig. 1). The issue of load balancing [3] in the wired
network (and how the different packets are split with respect to the backhaul capacity from a
main decentralized scheduler), although important, is not dealt with in this contribution and we
will suppose that perfect load balancing holds.
In this paper, we focus on the resource allocation problem for the downlink scenario (from
femto-cell group to MTs) using OFDM air-interface [4] over a number of dedicated sub-channels.
We assume that all these femto-cells get independent independent packets (network coding is
applied at the source) from the Internet via their backhauls, and send them physically to each
MT in a distributed manner. Usually, in this situation each femto-cell needs to decide how
to distribute the total available transmit power over N downlink sub-channels (sub-carriers or
clusters of sub-carriers), i.e., should it allocate all its power to a single sub-channel, spread the
power over all the sub-channels, or choose some subset of sub-channels on which to transmit?
Traditionally, this resource allocation problem is considered as a global optimization problem.
It is well known that the problem of maximizing a single user’s sum-rate (corresponding to
the Shannon transmission rate [5]) over all the sub-channels is a classic convex optimization
problem [6], whose solution is “waterfilling” [7, 8, 9]. The multi-user version of this problem
is, a non-convex optimization which is generally difficult to find the exact solution, since it
may have several local optimal points [10, 11, 12]. However, to solve the multi-user problem,
it usually requires a central computing resource (a scheduler with comprehensive knowledge of
the channel state information (CSI)) to globally manage the system resources. This process is
centralized, it involves feedback and overhead communication whose load scales linearly with
the number of transmitters and receivers in the network.
It is certainly possible to improve the useful data transmissions by reducing transmissions
of insignificant or unnecessary feedback information. In this direction, a selective multi-user
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3diversity algorithm has been introduced in [13]. The key idea is to find a suitable trade-off
between the network performance and the feedback load. Nevertheless, this partial feedback
approach still has its self-limitation in network scaling problems. As wireless networks are
becoming more and more dense, the global optimization approach will be more and more difficult
to meet the needs of future wireless communication development.
Within the recent ten years, increased research interest has been given to self-organizing wire-
less networks in which nodes allocate resources in a decentralized manner [1]. Non-cooperative
games theory [14], borrowed from many economic applications [15] provides an alternative
solution by considering every femto-cell as a selfish player who “plays” the game by rationally
choosing its transmit power levels. In this respect, it is important to study the NE [16] (the
solution concept of non-cooperative games) because it represents a predictable outcome for a
self-organizing network.
It is worth to mention that a special case of this game has been studied in [10], where the
authors show an infinite number of NE under their specific channel gain assumptions. However,
up to now, the characterization of NE in the wireless setting is still not clear as it depends on the
channel fading statics and the number of players. The goal of this paper is therefore to address
this fundamental problem as well as the convergence issue.
The paper is organized in the following form: In section II, we introduce the problem for-
mulation. In section III, we study the existence and uniqueness of NE and we characterize the
NE set. In section IV, we study the problem as a potential game. Finally, numerical results are
provided in section V followed by conclusions in section VI.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
A. Multi-user OFDM model
We consider an OFDM downlink scenario with M non-cooperative APs simultaneously send-
ing information to N MTs over N sub-channels (as shown in Fig. 2). We assume that each
sub-channel is pre-assigned to a different MT by a scheduler, i.e., each MT receives signals
only on the assigned sub-channel. Without loss of generality, throughout this paper we assign
sub-channel n to MT n, for n = 1, . . . , N . This implies that both MT set and sub-channel set
share the same index in our context.
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4Furthermore, we assume that the sub-channels are block fading, i.e. the channel fading coeffi-
cients are constant during the transmission of a codewords or block. Within a given transmission
block, let G ∈ RM×N++ be the channel gain matrix whose (m,n) entry is gm,n, the channel gain
of the link from AP m to MT n on the pre-assigned sub-channel n. We assume that G is a
random M × N matrix with i.i.d. (due to independent fading) entries. We further assume that
the distribution function of each positive entry gm,n is a continuous function.
By assuming that the MTs use low complexity single-user decoders [7], we can write the
signal-to-interference-plus-noise-ratio (SINR) of the signal from AP m received at MT n as
γm,n =
gm,npm,n
σ2 +
∑M
j=1,j 6=m gj,npj,n
where pm,n is the power transmitted from AP m on sub-channel n, σ2 is the variance of the
white Gaussian noise. For AP m, write the maximum achievable sum-rate as [7]
Rm =
N∑
n=1
log (1 + γm,n) , ∀m (1)
and the power constraint as
N∑
n=1
pm,n ≤ P
max
m , ∀m (2)
where Pmaxm is maximum transmit power of AP m and Pmaxm > 0, ∀m.
B. As a non-cooperative game
Here, we introduce a non-cooperative strategic game for this OFDM model. Intuitively, the
natural goal of each AP m is to maximize the transmission rate Rm (1) by choosing its
transmit power vector pm , [pm,1 . . . pm,N ]T, subject to its power constraint (2). Denote by
p =
[
pT1 , . . . ,p
T
M
]T the outcome of the game in terms of transmit power levels of all M APs
on N sub-channels. We can completely describe this non-cooperative resource allocation game
as
G ,
[
M, {Pm}m∈M , {um}m∈M
]
where the elements of the game are
• Player set: M = {1, . . . ,M};
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5• Strategy set: {P1, . . . ,PM}, where the strategy of player m is
Pm =
{
pm : pm,n ≥ 0,∀n and
N∑
n=1
pm,n ≤ P
max
m
}
;
• Utility or payoff function set: {u1, . . . , uM}, with
um (pm,p−m) =
N∑
n=1
log
(
1 +
gm,npm,n
σ2 +
∑
j 6=m gj,npj,n
)
= Rm
where p−m denotes the power vector of length (M−1)N consisting of elements of p other
than the mth element, i.e.,
p−m = [p
T
1 , . . . ,p
T
m−1,p
T
m+1, . . . ,p
T
M ]
T
III. CHARACTERIZATION OF NASH EQUILIBRIUM
A. Definition of Nash equilibrium
In such a non-cooperative game setting, each player m acts selfishly, aiming to maximize its
own payoff, given other players’ strategies and regardless of the impact of its strategy may have
on other players and thus on the overall performance. The process of such selfish behaviors
usually results in Nash equilibrium, a common solution concept for non-cooperative games [16].
Definition 3.1: A power strategy profile p⋆ is a Nash equilibrium if for every m ∈M,
um
(
p⋆m,p
⋆
−m
)
≥ um
(
pm,p
⋆
−m
) (3)
for all pm ∈ Pm.
From above, it is clear that a NE simply represents a particular “steady” state of a system,
in the sense that, once reached, no player has any motivation to unilaterally deviate from it.
In many cases, the NE represents the result of learning and evolution of all the participants.
Therefore, it becomes fundamentally important to predict and characterize such point(s) from
the system design perspective of wireless networks. In the rest of the paper, we will focus on
charactering such point(s). The following questions will be addressed one by one:
• Does a NE exist in our game?
• Is the NE unique or there exist multiple NE points?
• How to reach a NE if it exists?
• How does the system perform at NE?
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6B. Existence and uniqueness of Nash equilibrium
It is known that in general NE point does not necessarily exist. Therefore, we first investigate
the existence of NE in our game. We introduce the following theorem:
Theorem 3.2: A Nash equilibrium exists in the OFDM game G.
Proof: Since Pm is convex, closed, and bounded for each m; um (pm,p−m) is continuous
in both pm and p−m; and um (pm,p−m) is concave in pm for any set p−m, at least one Nash
equilibrium point exists for G [17], [15].
Once existence is established, it is natural to consider the characterization of the equilibrium
set. The uniqueness of an equilibrium is quite a desirable property, if we wish to predict what will
be the network behavior. But unfortunately many game problems have more than one equilibrium
point [15]. As an example of system with infinite NE we could consider a special instance of our
game, namely the symmetric waterfilling game. This case is studied in [10] and it is characterized
by equal cross-talk channel coefficients. Then, in general, our game G does not have a unique
equilibrium. Nevertheless, under the assumption of i.i.d. continuous entries in G, we will show
that the probability of having a unique Nash equilibrium is equal to 1.
For any player m, given all other players’ strategy profile p−m, the best-response power
strategy pm can be found by solving the following maximization problem,
max
pm
um (pm,p−m)
s.t.
N∑
n=1
pm,n ≤ P
max
m (4)
pm,n ≥ 0, ∀n
which is a convex optimization problem, since the objective function um is concave in pm and the
constraint set is convex. Therefore, the Karush-Kuhn-Tucker (KKT) conditions for optimization
are sufficient and necessary for the optimality [6]. The KKT conditions are derived from the
Lagrangian for each player m,
Lm (p, λ, ν) =
N∑
n=1
log
(
1 +
gm,npm,n
σ2 +
∑
j 6=m gj,npj,n
)
− λm
(
N∑
n=1
pm,n − P
max
m
)
+
N∑
n=1
νm,npm,n
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7and are given by
gm,n
σ2 +
∑M
j=1 gj,npj,n
− λm + νm,n = 0, ∀n (5)
λm
(
N∑
n=1
pm,n − P
max
m
)
= 0 (6)
νm,npm,n = 0, ∀n (7)
where λm ≥ 0, νm,n ≥ 0, ∀m ∀n are dual variables associated with the power constraint and
transmit power positivity, respectively. The solution to (5)-(7) is known as waterfilling [7]
pm,n =
(
1
λm
−
σ2 +
∑
j 6=m gj,npj,n
gm,n
)+
, ∀n (8)
where (x)+ , max{0, x} and λm satisfies
N∑
n=1
(
1
λm
−
σ2 +
∑
j 6=m gj,npj,n
gm,n
)+
= Pmaxm . (9)
Before analyzing the equilibrium set, we derive the following theorem:
Theorem 3.3: A power strategy profile {p⋆1, . . . ,p⋆M} is a Nash equilibrium of the game G if
and only if each player’s power p⋆m is the single-player waterfilling result (8) while treating
other players’ signals as noise. The corresponding necessary and sufficient conditions are:
gm,n
σ2 +
∑M
j=1 gj,npj,n
− λm + νm,n = 0, ∀m ∀n (10)
λm
(
N∑
n=1
pm,n − P
max
m
)
= 0, ∀m (11)
νm,npm,n = 0, ∀m ∀n. (12)
The proof can be found in Appendix A.
From (10), it is easy to find λm > 0, since νm,n ≥ 0, gm,n > 0, ∀m ∀n. From (11), we have
N∑
n=1
pm,n = P
max
m , ∀m (13)
This equation implies that, at the NE, all APs must dedicate their maximum power. However,
it is still difficult to find an analytical solution for (10)-(12), since the system consisting of (8)
and (9) is nonlinear. To simplify this problem we consider linear equations instead of nonlinear
ones. The following lemma provides a key step in that direction.
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8Lemma 3.4: For any realization of channel matrix G, there exist unique values of the Lagrange
dual variables λ and ν for any Nash equilibrium of the game G. Furthermore, there is a unique
vector s = [s1, . . . , sn]T such that any vector p corresponding to a Nash equilibrium satisfies
M∑
m=1
gm,npm,n , sn, ∀n (14)
The proof can be found in Appendix B.
Now, let Z be the following (M +N)×MN matrix:
Z =


IM IM · · · IM
gT1 0TM · · · 0TM
0TM gT2 · · · 0TM
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
0TM 0TM · · · gTN


(M+N)×MN
where gn is the nth column of G, IM is the M ×M identity matrix, and 0M is the zero vector
of length M . Let c be the following vector of length M +N
c = [Pmax1 P
max
2 . . . P
max
m s1 s2 . . . sN ]
T
Then, (13) and (14) can be written in the form of linear matrix equation
Zp = c (15)
Define the following sets
X , {(m,n) : νm,n = 0}
N , {n : ∃m such that (m,n) ∈ X}
and denote by |X | and |N | their cardinalities. From equation (12), if an index (m,n) /∈ X we
must have pm,n = 0. Without loss of generality, we assume that N = {1, . . . , N˜} for N˜ ≤ N .
Let Z˜ be the (M + N˜)×MN˜ matrix formed from the first M + N˜ rows and first MN˜ columns
of Z, p˜ is formed from the first MN˜ elements of p, and c˜ is formed from the first M + N˜
elements of c. Then, any NE solution must satisfy
Z˜p˜ = c˜. (16)
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9Let Zˆ be the (M + N˜) × |X | matrix formed from the columns of Z˜ that correspond to the
elements of X . Similarly, let pˆ be the vector of length |X | with entries pm,n such that (m,n) ∈ X
(same order as they were in p). Then any NE solution must satisfy
Zˆpˆ = c˜. (17)
Lemma 3.5: For any realization of a random M × N channel gain matrix G with i.i.d.
continuous entries, if MN˜ > M + N˜ , the probability that |X | ≤M + N˜ is equal to 1.
Lemma 3.6:
1) If MN˜ > M + N˜ and |X | ≤M + N˜ , the probability that rank(Zˆ) = |X | is equal to 1.
2) If MN˜ ≤M + N˜ , the probability that rank(Z˜) = MN˜ is equal to 1.
The proofs of Lemma 3.5 and 3.6 can be found in Appendix C and D, respectively.
Based on the results from Lemma 3.4 to Lemma 3.6, we derive the following theorem.
Theorem 3.7: For any realization of a random M × N channel gain matrix G with i.i.d.
continuous entries, the probability that a unique Nash equilibrium exists in the game G is equal
to 1.
The proof can be found in Appendix E.
Thus, from Theorem 3.2 and 3.7, we have established the existence and uniqueness of NE in
our game G.
IV. CONVERGENCE TO THE NASH EQUILIBRIUM
Equilibrium is meaningful in practice only if it is reachable from non-equilibria states. In
fact, there is no reason to expect a system to operate initially at equilibrium. The “convergence
to equilibrium” is in general a much harder problem which is usually related to the analy-
sis of synchronous or asynchronous update mechanisms (see some references for interference
channels [20, 21]).
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A. Potential game approaches
Fortunately, our game G can be studied as a potential game1. Potential games are known to have
nice properties for the convergence of the best-response or greedy algorithms to the equilibrium.
All the potential games admit a potential function. This potential function is a unique global
function that all the players optimize when they optimize their own utility functions. Thus, the set
of pure Nash equilibria can be found by simply locating the local optima of the potential function.
Such games have received increasing attention recently in wireless networks [24, 25, 26], since
the existence of potential function enables the design of fully distributed algorithms for resource
allocation problems.
In fact, there are various notions of potential games (with different definitions related to slightly
different properties for the existence and convergence of equilibrium), such as exact potential,
weighted potential, ordinal potential, generalized ordinal potential, pseudo potential, etc. Here
we only give the definition of the exact potential games, which is closely related to our game.
Definition 4.1: A strategic game G is called an exact potential game if there exists a function
v : P 7→ R satisfying
v (pm,p−m)− v (qm,p−m) = um (pm,p−m)− um (qm,p−m) , ∀m (18)
for all (pm,p−m) , (qm,p−m) ∈ P . The function v is called as exact potential of the game.
Obviously, equation (18) implies that the NE of the original game G must coincide with the
NE of the potential game, which is defined as a new game taking potential function v as utility
functions for all the players. Therefore, we can transform the non-cooperative strategic game G
into a potential game, if we can find a potential function that quantifies the difference in the
utility function due to unilaterally deviating each player, as indicated in (18).
Taking inspiration from the result derived in the single channel case [25], it is not difficult
to see that in our multi-channel case, G is an exact potential game with the following potential
1The notation of potential games was firstly used for games in strategic form by Rosenthal (1973) [19], and later generalized
and summarized by Monderer (1996) [22].
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function v⋆, i.e.,
v⋆(pm,p−m) =
N∑
n=1
log
(
σ2 +
M∑
m=1
gm,npm,n
)
=
N∑
n=1
log

gm,npm,n +
(
σ2 +
∑
j 6=m
gj,npj,n
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
aggregate interference + noise

 (19)
Denote by ζm,n the term
(
σ2 +
∑
j 6=m gj,npj,n
)
, which represents the aggregate interference plus
noise to user m’s signal on sub-channel n. Now, the potential function v⋆ is a common utility
for all players in the potential game.
In order to find the single-user best-response in the potential game, one needs to solve the
following maximization problem:
max
pm
v⋆(pm,p−m)⇔ max
pm
N∑
n=1
log (ζm,n + gm,npm,n)
s.t.
N∑
n=1
pm,n ≤ P
max
m (20)
pm,n ≥ 0, ∀n
Only when the private channel gain gm = {gm,1, . . . , gm,N} and the aggregate interference plus
noise ζm = {ζm,1, . . . , ζm,N} are both known to player m, (20) can be solved as a convex
optimization. It is easy to verify that this single-user best-response is the same waterfilling
solution expressed in (8), due to the property of potential function.
B. Distributed algorithm and convergence property
Note also that if each AP has complete knowledge of the channel state information, i.e.,
the matrix G (as considered in Section II), the uniqueness of the Nash equilibrium guaranties
that each AP can determine independently in a decentralized way the power allocation at the
Nash equilibrium. In order to acquire information about the whole channel matrix G is typically
necessary a feedback channel from MSs to APs to transmit the channel estimations. In fact, in
this case each AP can perform locally the best-response algorithm described in the following
section and based on repeated maximization of problem (20) by starting from a random point
October 2, 2009 DRAFT
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p−m ∈
∏
j 6=mP . However, the structure of the problem (20) suggests an alternative approach to
reduce eventually the signalling on the feedback channel. In fact, the repeated optimization of
problem (20) could be performed in a distributed way feeding back at the APs only the private
channel gain gm and the aggregate interference plus noise ζm. Nevertheless, note that such a
distributed implementation of the algorithm would lead to a temporary phase where the APs
are not transmitting at an equilibrium point. In our numerical results we will ignore the cost of
feedback, and we focus on analyzing the theoretic upper-bound.
From the above discussion, we introduce a simple algorithm based on the iterative waterfill-
ing [28] that players can follow to reach the NE
Algorithm 1 DPIWF algorithm
initialize t = 0, p(0)m,n = 0, ∀m ∀n
repeat
t = t+ 1
for m = 1 to M do
for n = 1 to N do
ζ
(t)
m,n = σ2 +
∑
j 6=m
gj,np
(t)
j,n
end for[
p
(t+1)
m,1 , . . . , p
(t+1)
m,N
]
= arg max
pm≥0∑
n pm,n≤P¯m
∑
n
log
(
ζ
(t)
m,n + gm,npm,n
)
end for
until convergence
In this algorithm, we assume that the same game could be myopically played repeatedly:
in each round, every myopic player (player has no memory of past game-rounds) chooses its
best-response according to the single-player waterfilling that depends on the current state of the
game. The following theorem shows the convergence and optimality of the algorithm.
Theorem 4.2: The DPIWF algorithm converges to a Nash equilibrium of the OFDM non-
cooperative game G.
The proof can be found in Appendix F.
Although the final convergence (in power allocation) of DPIWF is proved, one may wonder
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whether the convergence behavior of the actual total network rate (the objective function in
(21)) coincide with the convergence behavior of the corresponding potential function (19). We
will discuss this issue in our simulation part.
A more general discussion about the convergence properties of potential games can be found
in [22], where it shows that every bounded potential game2 has the approximate finite improve-
ment property (AFIP), i.e., for every ǫ > 0, every ǫ-improvement path is finite. Then, it is
obvious that every such finite improvement path of the exact potential games terminates in an
ǫ-equilibrium3 point. In other words, the sequential best-response (players move in turn and
always choose a best-response) converges to the ǫ-equilibrium independent of the initial point.
Note that this is a very flexible condition for the convergence, since order of playing can be
deterministic or random and need not to be synchronized. It is one of the most interesting
properties of the potential games, especially in order to distributively find the equilibrium in
self-organizing systems.
It is not difficult to find that the simultaneous best-response (at each iteration, all the players
choose their best-responses simultaneously) does not necessarily converges, due to the “ping-
pong” effect generated by myopic players. However, [23] has shown that for infinite pseudo-
potential games (a general case of exact potential games) with convex strategy space and single-
valued best-response4, the sequence of simultaneous best-response (reminiscent of fictitious play)
also converges to the equilibrium.
It is interesting to note that for many practical systems with finite transmit power states,
the similar results still hold for the convergence of the sequential best-response. The only
difference is that, in the finite case, the existence of exact potential function implies the finite
improvement property (FIP), and therefore, the sequential best-response converges to the exact
Nash equilibrium (instead of ǫ-equilibrium).
V. NUMERICAL EVALUATION
In this part, numerical results are provided to validate our theoretical claims. We consider
frequency-selective fading channels with channel matrix G of size M×N , where M is the total
2A game is called a bounded game if the payoff functions are bounded.
3An ǫ-equilibrium is a strategy profile that approximately satisfies the condition of Nash equilibrium.
4Games with strictly multi-concave potential (concave in each players’ unilateral deviation) have single-valued best-response
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number of transmitters (players) and N is the total number of receivers. We assume the Rayleigh
fading channel gain gm,n are i.i.d. among players and for different sub-channels. The maximum
power constraint for each player m is asummed to be identical and normalized as P¯m = 1.
In Fig. 3, we show the convergence behaviors of potential function and the actual total network
rate (we will use the short term “actual rate”) by using the proposed DPIWF algorithm for a
random channel realization. We set the number of transmitters to M = 10 and the number of
receivers to N = 10. As expected, in both Fig. 3a and Fig. 3b the potential function converges
rapidly (at the 4th iteration). In Fig. 3a, the actual rate converges slightly slower (at the 6th
iteration) and maintains the monotonically increasing slope. However, in Fig. 3b, the actual rate
finally converges, but unfortunately it neither monotonically increases nor rapidly converges (at
the 34th iteration) comparing to the convergence speed of its potential function. Note that we
use this example in order to show readers that a “defective” convergence (for the actual rate)
may happen during the iteration steps of DPIWF algorithm, whereas (we will show immediately
that) the actual rate converges “ideally” in most cases for a random channel gain matrix with
i.i.d. Gaussian entries.
In order to measure the performance efficiency of distributed networks operating at the unique
NE, we provide here the optimal power allocation strategy in centralized approaches as a
target upper-bound for the total network rate (which is the transmit sum-rate of all players
in the network). We will ignore the performance loss due to the necessary uplink and downlink
signalling transmission. The total network rate maximization problem can be formulated as
max
p
M∑
m=1
um (p)
s.t.
∑
n
pm,n ≤ P¯m, ∀m (21)
pm,n ≥ 0, ∀m ∀n
which unfortunately is a difficult problem, since the objective function is non-convex in p.
However, a relaxation of this optimization problem (see in [12]) can be considered as a geometric
programming problem [27], therefore, can be transformed into a convex optimization problem.
A low complexity algorithm was proposed in [12] to solve the dual problem by updating
dual variables through a gradient descent. Note that the algorithm always converges, but may
converges to a local maximum point in a few cases. We will use this algorithm in our simulations.
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In the following part, we will address two main practical questions through numerical results:
1) How does the network performance behave at the unique NE (the decentralized optimality)
in comparison to the global optimal solution (the centralized optimality)? More precisely,
we are interested in comparing the average total network rate instead of the instantaneous
total network rate, i.e. u¯(M,N) is the average total network rate for a M transmitters and
N receivers system,
u¯(M,N) = EG
[
M∑
m=1
N∑
n=1
log
(
1 +
pm,ngm,n
σ2 +
∑
j 6=m pj,ngj,n
)]
2) What about the convergence behavior for the actual total network rate when using DPIWF
algorithm? Does it converge rapidly (as in Fig. 3a) for most cases?
Let’s consider the first question. In Fig. 4, we compare the average total network rate of both
decentralized and centralized networks for two different channel noise levels σ2 = 0.1 and 1,
respectively. Network parameters are selected as follows: the number of transmitters M ∈ [1, 25],
the number of receivers N takes several representative values, such as 5, 10 and 15. The plots
are obtained through Monte-Carlo simulations over 104 realizations for the channel gain matrix
G. First, we can see in both figures Fig. 4a and Fig. 4b, the centralized optimality always
outperforms the decentralized optimality. Second, for a fixed number of transmitters N , when
we increase the number of receivers M , the performance loss of decentralized systems (compare
to centralized systems) becomes more and more apparent. In fact, this phenomenon can be
intuitively understood as follows: when there are a great number of selfish players, the hostile
competition turns the multi-user communication system into an interference-limited environment,
where interference begins to dominate the performance efficiency.
Moreover, we note that in Fig. 4 the average performance of centralized systems is an increas-
ing function of M (for a fixed value of N ), and the average performance of decentralized systems
corresponding to NE show an increasing slope before diminishing and reaching convergence. For
the typical values of N , i.e., N = 5, 10 and 15, in Fig. 4a, when σ2 = 0.1 the average performance
of decentralized systems are maximized approximately at M = 4, 9, 14, respectively; in Fig. 4b,
when σ2 = 1 the average performance of decentralized systems are maximized approximately
at M = 6, 11, 16, respectively. It simply shows that different noise variance (in general channel
condition) have a different impact on the decentralized system performance. This observation is
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fundamentally important for improving the spectral efficiency of a distributed multi-user OFDM
hot-spot network: for a given area (given the number of receivers N and the current channel
condition), there exists an optimal number of hot-spots (denoted as M⋆) to be put in the network.
Roughly speaking: when M > M⋆, the system is overloaded due to the increase of competition
over limited resources; when M < M⋆, the system is operated at the unsaturated state, since
system resources are not fully exploited.
Let’s now consider the second question. In Fig. 5, we show the probability of convergence
to the decentralized optimality (NE) within 5 iterations for σ2 = 0.1 and 1, respectively. To be
more precise, we define the “convergence” as: the total network rate exceeds 99% performance
of the final rate. We find that the probability of convergence is quite satisfactory (more than
98.2% in all cases), and this convergence probability tends to 1 when M ≫ N and M ≪ N . An
interesting observation is that the minimal convergence probability always occurs when M = N ,
regardless of the noise variance value σ2.
VI. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORKS
In this paper we described the wireless small-cell networks as a strategic non-cooperative
game. Each transmitter (AP) is modeled as a player in the game who decides, in a distributed
way, the strategy of how to allocate its total power through several independent fading channels.
We studied the existence and uniqueness of NE. Under the condition of independent continuous
fading channels, we showed that the probability of the equilibrium being unique is equal to 1.
Convergence issues have been addressed based on potential game analysis. Numerical studies
have shown that, with very high probability, the DPIWF algorithm converges to 99% of the final
rate under 5 iterations.
APPENDIX
A. Proof of Theorem 3.3
Proof: We prove the necessary and sufficient parts separately.
1) Proof of necessary condition (the only if part): From the definition of NE (Definition
3.1), if a power set {pm} is a NE, it must satisfy all the best-response conditions in
(3) simultaneously. Suppose a situation that all the players’ power except player m’s
power reaches the NE point:
{
p⋆1, . . . , p
⋆
m−1, pm, p
⋆
m+1, . . . , p
⋆
M
}
. In this case when all other
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players’ powers are fixed, as shown in (4), the best-response of player m is to set its power
according to (8), which is exactly given by the single-player waterfilling treating all other
players’ signals as noise.
2) Proof of sufficient condition (the if part): From convex optimization theory [6], we know
that the KKT conditions of the convex optimization problem are necessary and sufficient
conditions for optimality. Therefore, we can say that a power strategy pm satisfies the best
response condition if and only if it satisfies the single-player KKT conditions (5)-(7). Then
collectively, we say a set {pm} satisfies all the best-response conditions simultaneously
if and only if it satisfies (10)-(12). From Definition 3.1, if a set {pm} satisfies all the
best-response conditions, it must be a NE.
This completes the proof.
B. Proof of Lemma 3.4
Proof: Consider a NE p ∈ RKN×1, from Theorem 3.3, the following equation is true
φ (p) + ν − λ = 0
where
φ (p) =


g1,1
σ2+
∑
j
pj,1gj,1
g1,2
σ2+
∑
j
pj,1gj,1
.
.
.
gK,N
σ2+
∑
j
pj,Ngj,N


KN×1
ν =


ν1,1
ν1,2
.
.
.
νK,N


KN×1
λ =


(λ1)N×1
(λ2)N×1
.
.
.
(λK)N×1


KN×1
Now, assume there exist two different Nash equilibria, e.g. p0,p1 (p0 6= p1), the following
equation must also hold
[
(p1 − p0)
T
(p0 − p1)
T
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
αT



 φ (p0)
φ (p1)


︸ ︷︷ ︸
β
+

 ν0 − λ0
ν1 − λ1


︸ ︷︷ ︸
γ

 = 0 (22)
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from where we have
αTβ =
(
p1 − p0
)T
φ(p0) + (p0 − p1)Tφ(p1)
=
N∑
n=1
K∑
k=1
[
(p1k,n − p
0
k,n)
gk,n
σ2 +
∑K
j=1 p
0
j,ngj,n
+ (p0k,n − p
1
k,n)
gk,n
σ2 +
∑K
j=1 p
1
j,ngj,n
]
=
N∑
n=1
K∑
k=1
gk,n
(
p0k,n − p
1
k,n
)∑K
j=1
[
gj,n
(
p0j,n − p
1
j,n
)](
σ2 +
∑K
j=1 p
0
j,ngj,n
)(
σ2 +
∑K
j=1 p
1
j,ngj,n
)
=
N∑
n=1
[∑K
j=1 gj,n
(
p0j,n − p
1
j,n
)]2
(
σ2 +
∑K
j=1 p
0
j,ngj,n
)(
σ2 +
∑K
j=1 p
1
j,ngj,n
) ≥ 0
and
αTγ =
(
p1 − p0
)T (
ν0 − λ0
)
+ (p0 − p1)T
(
ν1 − λ1
)
=
N∑
n=1
K∑
k=1
[
(p1k,n − p
0
k,n)(ν
0
k,n − λ
0
k) + (p
0
k,n − p
1
k,n)(ν
1
k,n − λ
1
k)
]
=
K∑
k=1


(
N∑
n=1
p1k,n −
N∑
n=1
p0k,n
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
P¯k−P¯k=0
(λ1k − λ
0
k)

+
N∑
n=1
K∑
k=1
(
p0k,nν
1
k,n + p
1
k,nν
0
k,n
)
=
N∑
n=1
K∑
k=1
(
p0k,nν
1
k,n + p
1
k,nν
0
k,n
)
≥ 0
From above, it is easy to see that (22) holds if and only if we have αTβ = 0 and αTγ = 0,
which are equivalent to the following two equations, respectively,
K∑
k=1
gk,np
0
k,n −
K∑
k=1
gk,np
1
k,n = 0, ∀n (23)
p0k,nν
1
k,n = p
1
k,nν
0
k,n = 0, ∀n ∀k (24)
First, from (23), we observe that the value of sn (=
∑
k gk,npk,n) is fixed for any NE point.
Second, for a specific positive power coefficient, e.g. p0k∗,n∗ > 0, we must have ν0k∗,n∗ = 0 due
to (7), therefore, from (24) we must also have ν1k∗,n∗ = 0. This implies λ1k∗ = λ0k∗ because of
(5). Finally, we obtain ν0k∗,n = ν1k∗,n ∀n, since we have shown that sn is fixed for any NE point.
The same proof holds for any other index k∗.
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C. Proof of Lemma 3.5
Proof: When νm,n = 0 , from (5) we have
λm − gm,ndn = 0, ∀(m,n) ∈ X (25)
where dn , 1σ2+sn . From Lemma 3.4, we know that all the Nash equilibria must satisfy (25),
with the same λm and dn. In (25), the number of independent linear equations is |X |, while the
number of unknown parameters is M+N˜ (since the rest of dn, n /∈ N is known to be dn = 1σ2 ).
It is well known that the solution to the system of linear equations is the empty set, if the number
of independent equations is larger than the number of variables [18]. Since each entry gm,n is
i.i.d. random, it is obvious that, with probability 1, the equations in (25) are independent from
each other, therefore, we must have |X | ≤M + N˜ .
D. Proof of Lemma 3.6
Proof: We only give the proof for case 1) MN˜ > M + N˜ , case 2) MN˜ ≤M + N˜ can be
proved in a similar way. Matrix Zˆ can be transformed into a 2× 2 block matrices, by applying
some elementary column and row operations, as follows,
Zˆ
column
−→

 Iτ Aτ×ξ2
Bξ1×τ Cξ1×ξ2

 column−→

 Iτ 0τ×ξ2
Bξ1×τ Cˆξ1×ξ2

 row−→

 Iτ 0τ×ξ2
0ξ1×τ Cˆξ1×ξ2


where τ = min{M, N˜}, ξ1 = M + N˜ − τ ≥ τ, ξ2 = |X | − τ . Cˆ is a ξ1 × ξ2 matrix, where
each column contains one or two random variables, and each row contains at least one random
variable. Again we can transform Cˆ in row echelon form, denoted as Cˆr. Note that the rank of
Cˆr is ξ2 with probability 1, since each leading coefficient of a row is a random variable or the
linear combination of two i.i.d. random variables. So, with probability 0, any leading coefficient
takes the value of 0. Therefore, we have rank(Zˆ) = τ + ξ2 = |X | with probability 1.
E. Proof of Theorem 3.7
Proof: If MN˜ > M+N˜ , we have from Lemma 3.5 that, with probability 1, rank(Zˆ) = |X |.
Any NE must satisfy (17); assume that two different power strategies pˆ and pˆ′ are both solutions
to (17). Then Zˆ (pˆ− pˆ′) = 0. By the rank-nullity theorem [18], since the rank of Zˆ is equal to
the number of its columns, this implies pˆ− pˆ′ = 0, which means there must be exactly one NE.
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If MN˜ ≤ M + N˜ , we have from Lemma 3.6 that, with probability 1, there is at most one
solution to (16). Since any NE must satisfy (16) and we know that there is at least one NE
solution, so the NE must be unique.
F. Proof of Theorem 4.2
Proof: We prove this theorem in two steps.
1) Algorithm convergence: It is easy to see that the potential function v⋆ (P) is non-decreasing
within each round of the single-player waterfilling. Moreover, since each player’s transmit
power is limited by a maximum but finite power constraint, there must exist an upper-bound
for the potential function v⋆ (P). This confirms the convergence.
2) Converge to NE: From the discussions above, we directly have that the KKT condition of
the potential game coincide with the KKT condition of the original OFDM game G, due
to the property of potential function (18). By using the sufficient part of Theorem 3.3, we
know that if each player’s power allocation pm is given by the single-player waterfilling
while treating other players’s signals as noise, the set {pm} must be a NE of the original
game G. Therefore, we can conclude that if the algorithm DPIWF converges (through the
process of iterating single-player waterfilling), it must converge to a NE point.
This completes the proof.
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Fig. 1 Illustration of femto-cell group with distributed network information flow
Fig. 2 The multi-user OFDM model
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(b) An example of “defective” convergence
Fig. 3 Convergence and performance of potential function and actual total network rate
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Fig. 4 Average total network rate, decentralized vs. centralized optimality
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Fig. 5 Probability of convergence within 5 iterations
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